During the emergency phase (1992 – 1995), the responsibility for maintenance and most construction of rural water supplies lay with the Government of Mozambique (GOM). The 1997 evaluation for Care states “supply users regarded the systems as belonging to government and expected government to look after them and repair them, a role the GOM did not have the resources to fulfil. The result was a system which relied heavily on outside funding, with little or no ownership or financial contribution from consumers, and which quickly fell into disrepair.” In 1995 the GOM adopted a new policy (PNA) which “accentuates not only the sustainability triangle, but also the organisational triangle with the consumers at the apex.” This plan emphasises the role of participation by the users at all stages, and the role of the private sector in improving and maintaining water supplies.
Both Care and World Relief have attempted to follow the national water policy, although Care has been taking a greater lead in the development community responding to the PNA plan. It has not been easy to make the transition to community managed systems and the response varies from area to area depending on local authorities. Care in particular has taken the lead with pre-payment for pump-heads by communities and “stopping of free distribution of spare parts which were undermining the fragile but growing private sector spare parts stocking and sale”.
Given this evolution of responses with Mozambique both World Relief and Care have experience of an emergency response to the need for water supplies and of making a transition to a more “developmental” response
In Mozambique the official standardised pumps are the Afridev for up to 45m and the Volanta for over 45m. Both are well known pumps. Details of the Afridev and Volanta can be found in an appendix. The Volanta has some technical difficulties associated with it (eg cracking of pipe joints). World Relief persevered with the Volanta modifying the way it was installed to try to address the technical shortfalls. With the combination of the Volantas poor performance, plus the fact that the spares are relatively expensive and it would be difficult to set up a sustainable supply, Care decided that it was best to install Afridev pumps even to 60m. They reasoned that regular breakdowns of a less expensive pump tend to be better maintained than those with few but costly repairs.
World Relief’s Emergency Water Supply Programme was a response to the worsening drought situation along the Limpopo Corridor in the province of Gaza during 1992. The programme was designed to complement the governments rural water supply programme for Gaza and was an attempt to rapidly meet the needs of the population by providing access to clean water through the drilling of boreholes and installation of handpumps in accordance with government guidelines. Between November 1992 and July 1993 World Relief subcontracted a drilling company, drilled 41 boreholes and installed 29 handpumps in two phases. This represents a success rate in what was considered an unfavourable area for groundwater development of over 70%. The average direct cost of the borehole during this phase was $6,750. The average total cost per borehole with pump was $16,041.
The response of World Relief took into account the shifting needs of the population. During the emergency major settlements had developed along the Limpopo valley corridor. By strategic placement of water supplies at the more remote areas, on the heights of the valley sides, there was a planned intention to facilitate resettlement over a greater area.
The report for this stage states :- “Although emergency in nature, one of World Relief’s objectives was to ensure sustainability of the water supply in the long term. This was achieved through training of members of the community in pump management and maintenance and creating awareness within the community of the pump and other water related issues.” However, in practice during this phase trainings were short and the pump repair relied on an area mechanic.
Following that initial programme, World Relief undertook a number of amendments and extensions to its programmes, such that by 1995 it had installed 167 handpumps in the area. For most of this period the training focussed on selected individuals who would maintain pumps throughout the localised area. In addition there was a village pump attendant for basic pump supervision.
During an evaluation in 1997, it was noted “The maintenance team are repairing on average 20 to 23 pumps per month. One of the reasons for this is the excess use most are receiving. Many of the communities have grown rapidly since the pumps were installed.” We should note in these statements the reliance on a mobile team and the pressure on the boreholes. The 1997 evaluation continues, “There is a great deal of concern regarding the future of this maintenance programme.”
Since that report was written World Relief have closed their water programmes. 1997 and 1998 were years spent retraining villagers, and attempting to create a sustainable supply of spares. This research project occurred at a time when World Relief was in the final process of withdrawing as an agency from supporting repairs and maintenance. It was having discussions with local government about the equipment it had and whether all equipment should be handed over to the local authorities. However it continued to be in the area for other development activities.
Care started an emergency water supply project in Inhambane province in 1993. As with World Relief, Care made a rapid response to a drought stricken population who were also suffering the after effects of civil war. In that first phase approximately twenty functioning handpumps were installed. A second phase started in January 1995 called a Community Water and Sanitation Project (CWSP). “This phase was planned to be for three years and has concentrated on development issues, particularly those relating to sustainability and encouragement of demand responsive approaches”. The 1997 evaluation continues – “The move from emergency to development is seldom easy, as it requires the change of attitude of all involved, at community, project and government levels, and thus evolves gradually, rather than being an instantaneous transformation. During this evolution, CARE has encountered and overcome several problems which result from being an organisation at the forefront of such a change….”
The emergency proposals state that there would be community involvement during the siting of the pump, and that the community would be trained in VLOM. Inhambane was one of the first provinces to begin to recover from the war, and as a result communities in this region were better established. Even during the emergency phase, CARE was working with relatively stable communities. During the CWSP phase, a high demand for water and lack of alternative sources combined with the stability of the population to present favourable conditions for demand driven responses.
By 1997 there were 400 wells and boreholes in the four districts where Care works. Of these approximately 170 have been constructed or rehabilitated through the CARE projects. The direct costs of a borehole in the 95 to 97 period were on average $9,000 per community. In addition, if the total project costs are taken into account (facilitation and overhead) this figure rose considerably to give high overall costs. These costs include all the social mobilisation such as organising and facilitating prior contribution, post installation hygiene and sanitation education, etc.
As stated in the national context section, Care took a lead in implementing the PNA National water policy. This was not an easy task. New communities who wanted pumps were asked to purchase the pumphead from a local supplier. This “prior contribution” before drilling started was intended to stimulate ownership within the community for the pump. A secondary feature of this approach was to ensure the community made a connection with the local supplier and therefore knew where to get spares. This system was supported by training programmes for VLOM (although these had been in place before). It is interesting to note that the 1997 evaluation comments “Fund raising is well accepted by the communities if not always by the local politicians. It has helped strengthen a feeling of ownership…..”.
CARE Inhambane Project, Mozambique
CARE’s Afridev project in Inhambane has monitored pump performance since 1993. Many of the pumps have been installed to depths which are over 45m and serve more than 100 user families. In-country manufacture of pumps by a Dutch company has been established, with third party inspection, and the sale of spares has been commercialised since 1996.
Originally, communities only had to pay for routine preventive maintenance with the government or NGO providing major repairs for free. These were needed frequently given the large number of users and installation depths. In 1996 CARE began transferring full maintenance responsibility to communities by training ‘maintenance and repair groups’ (MRGs) at village level. These were to deal with all repairs including the removal and repair of rising mains, which sometimes cracked.
By December 1997, 97% of the 135 handpumps in the project were functioning and had an average downtime of less than 10 days. 77% of breakdowns were repaired wholly or partly by communities, 19% needed some external assistance and 4% were done by local government workshops or CARE.
Lessons from the Project
· Communities had the capacity to pay for routine maintenance and repair, but it was uncertain whether they could pay for major repairs such as replacement of the entire rising main. The involvement of the private sector helped in making unsubsidised spares available at acceptable prices.
· A backstopping system (a ‘second tier’) of local mechanics was recommended in addition to MRGs to support communities in those activities requiring more confidence and skill such as replacing the rising main, or fishing for dropped pipes and rods.
· A suitable technical solution for deep installations was needed due to a big increase in breakdowns at pump depths over 45m, of which pipe joint failure was a common cause.
(Obiols and Baumann, 1998, quoted from Colin 1999)
In 1992/93 an estimated 2 million Malawians experienced severe water shortages as a result of drought. A survey by Save the Children (SCF) during the 92/93 drought showed that 40 to 60% of the boreholes provided were out of use at any given time due to inadequate capacity for maintenance by the governments repair teams, lack of spares and lack of transportation. It was SCF that first initiated district wide community based management training for beneficiary communities in Malawi. The training covered technical operation and maintenance skills at community level, leadership skills, mechanisms for fund raising and financial management, and hygiene education and sanitation promotion. 1993/94 was a year of more drought in Malawi and some agencies continued to make a mixed response.
1988 to 1993 also saw the provision of water points to Mozambique refugees hosted by the Government of Malawi in refugee impacted districts. After the repatriation of the Mozambiquans, a total of 900 water points remained for use by Malawians in all the refugee impacted districts. UNHCR discontinued its centralised care and maintenance teams for the water points, and again about 40-50% were out of order at any given time thereafter.
The Afridev is the standard pump for boreholes up to 45m in Malawi. On shallow holes the Naira is installed.
Introducing VLOM in Malawi: The Karonga Experience
The Karonga project provided Afridev pumps to a population of 60,000; subsequently, four years were devoted to motivating and preparing the community for VLOM. It thereby served to test whether, given the right support, a community can manage their own water supplies using the VLOM approach.
In each village a water and health committee was established in addition to one committee per pump with at least two trained attendants for repair and maintenance. High-demand spares were supplied by a local wholesaler to village shops, while the government’s role was restricted to monitoring and policy-making. The intention was that even if the government did not fulfill its role, the pumps could still be maintained.
When the project began the Afridev had not been fully tested and some parts had to be changed on all pumps after installation. Appropriate tools had also not been designed. These problems were eventually resolved and in 1997, two years after all project support had ended, a study found that:
• 95% of the handpumps and boreholes were working, with 75% working “well”;
• communities repaired their handpumps, even replacing pump rods and rising main sections. However, they did no preventive maintenance or repairs to aprons and headworks;
• half of the pumps had either no or only one attendant. In most cases, at least one of the four essential tools had been lost or was never issued;
• most village water and health committees were defunct but pump committees remained active;
• communities had small amounts of cash on hand for maintenance but did not buy spares in advance of a breakdown. No regular contributions were made to maintenance funds; and
• village shops no longer sold spares, as there was too little business. Town-based wholesalers, however, still sold them. From Colin 1999
The combined forces of UNICEF, National Water Department and Concern Universal (CU) equipped Chikwawa District with 100 functioning boreholes through rehabilitation and new boreholes. While there was some consultation with communities, it was in 1994 that CU worked with UNICEF, the Water Department, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Women and Children Affairs and Community Services, to undertake a two year programme with two key training components. Hygiene Education and Sanitation Promotion (HESP) and Village Level Operation and Maintenance (VLOM).
In 1996 CU obtained funding from Department for International Development (DFID) UK to undertake a Water and Environmental Sanitation (WES) project. Its goal was to mitigate the recurrent effects of the droughts and improve health of targeted communities. It was to provide sustainable water supply systems and promote improve sanitation and hygiene practices. This work continued to be in partnership with the government of Malawi in Dedza, Ntcheu and Chikwawa districts. This programme had a planned component of community mobilisation. Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques were used to involve the community in the planning and implementation of the project. For this two year project 1996/98 CU installed or rehabilitated successfully approximately 138 boreholes and pumps.
CU used a Eureka small portable drilling rig for much of its work. This innovation can be found described in “Introduction of Low Cost Rotary Drilling to Malawi:
Specifically the Eureka Port-a-Rig” Concern Universal, BOND 1998. The paper notes that -“Given the present coverage and technologies available, Malawi urgently needs to find a means of accelerating it’s population’s access to clean water and adequate sanitation facilities. Investigations are necessary to find the technologies that are quickest and most cost effective for installing both water and sanitation facilities." The main advantage of the rig is “Low Cost. The nominal cost per hole using the Port-a-rig currently stands at approximately £1,200 or MK36,000. This is a very considerable saving over the use of commercial contractors, where total construction costs exceed MK100,000. The Port-a-rig can replace a good number of holes traditionally drilled by commercial contractors.”
As we can see the programmes are similar and have a similar evolution from an emergency to development approach. However, there are also differences in the details of the approaches. Between them and over the years, the agencies have undertaken, or have been involved with communities who have interacted with other agencies, such that the case studies cover a wide variety of approaches and factors.
For instance:-
On the number of mechanics trained:- WR had mechanics during their early programme but was now discouraging them in preference for VLOM. However, Care has come full circle and now sees that there is need for some competence at an area level to undertake the more difficult repairs. Concern Universal in Chikwawa trained the local grocery owners to stock spares and to understand how to do the second level repairs. Care in their strategy are not training single mechanics but a group who are able to do other things such as lobby local government.
The committee size and constitution varies from agency to agency. The words that one agency uses to distinguish roles are caretakers or committee. Caretakers do the work of maintenance and repair. For Care the executive committee do not do the work, they decide that the pump needs repairing and collect the money, an operational committee or maintenance group do the actual repairs, another group are for cleaning etc. Care currently encourages 12 in the committee with 6 doing the fund raising and 6 doing the O&M. CU in Malawi has 10 people who all tend to do the same thing, although only 3 are officially trained in mechanics.
The role of government varies. In Malawi the work was co-operative with the Government and the Health Surveillance Assistant (HSA) have become a vital component of the ongoing support to the VLOM system . The role of the HSA in the Malawian system is important. They relate to the Ministry of Health as opposed to the Ministry of Water. The HSAs have responsibility for only 5 or 6 villages each where as the official water mechanic from the Ministry has about 100 villages in his (her) responsibility. The HSA makes proactive visits the village regularly while the Water Monitoring Assistant (WMA) tends only to respond to requests for a visit.
Country/cultural differences occur. The committee have to feedback the expenses to the community in Mozambique, while in Malawi they seem to rely much more on the natural meetings that generally occur rather than have special “pump” meetings. In Mozambique the agencies encourage a more planned public accountability. So while in Malawi, CU has training sessions on financial management, the feedback is more integrated with village life e.g. funerals, weddings, general gatherings; they also use the church and school. In Mozambique if they need a meeting then the person by the pump tells the people to come. Regarding motivation and payment, the person by the pump gets some benefits – free water, labour for their fields – and notes who is getting lot of water etc.
Some differences between the countries are minor such as the details of tracking water payments. In Malawi the communities have cards for who has or has not paid and the cards were designed by the community. In Mozambique they also use the card system. They have a community member sit by the pump and collect payment, sign the card and/or list.
Community differences:- For some variables, such as storage of money for spares, the situation changes for every community. In Mozambique some communities have treasurers who keep the money. To store the money they sometimes (but not often) use the bank. Alternatively they put it with a man who has a lot of animals so they can reclaim the animals if something goes wrong or they spread it among a few people so that if someone runs away they only lose a small part of it.
It is not necessary to document all the different details of the systems covered by the research project. The preferred options are covered in the results section.